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Criminal convictions require proof that a prohibited act was
performed in a statutorily specified mental state. Different legal
consequences, including greater punishments, are mandated for
those who act in a state of knowledge, compared with a state of
recklessness. Existing research, however, suggests people have
trouble classifying defendants as knowing, rather than reckless,
even when instructed on the relevant legal criteria. We used a
machine-learning technique on brain imaging data to predict, with
high accuracy, which mental state our participants were in. This
predictive ability depended on both the magnitude of the risks and
the amount of information about those risks possessed by the
participants. Our results provide neural evidence of a detectable
difference in the mental state of knowledge in contrast to reckless-
ness and suggest, as a proof of principle, the possibility of inferring
from brain data in which legally relevant category a person belongs.
Some potential legal implications of this result are discussed.
neurolaw | mental states | knowledge | recklessness | elastic-net model
Imagine you are a juror in the trial of a defendant who admits tohaving transported a suitcase full of drugs across international
borders. However, you do not know how aware she was of the
presence of drugs in that suitcase. The degree of awareness she
had at the time she crossed the border will make a difference to
her criminal culpability and, in turn, to the amount of punish-
ment she faces.
Conviction for a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of both the crime’s actus reus—a set of statutorily specified
acts, results, and circumstances, such as crossing a border while
in possession of drugs—and the crime’s mens rea—a set of statu-
torily specified mental states including, for instance, knowledge that
one is in possession of drugs when one crosses the border. The
Model Penal Code (MPC), which is followed in many jurisdictions
in the United States, distinguishes among four different psycho-
logical states a person can be in with respect to each element of a
crime’s actus reus: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negli-
gence. The Code also specifies that these decrease in culpability: it
is worse, for instance, to cross the border knowing you have drugs
(as one is if sure that one has them) than to do so while reckless
with respect to that fact (as one is if aware of a “substantial and
unjustifiable risk” that one is carrying drugs, but uncertain that one
is) (MPC §2.02). The MPC’s four-part taxonomy, however, relies
on at least two assumptions: (i) people actually differ psychologi-
cally in the ways that the MPC sets out; and (ii) average people
(potential jurors) can effectively categorize real-world mental states
in accordance with the Code’s definitions (1). Considering the
dramatic effects that different mental-state assignments can have
on the freedom of criminal defendants, it is surprising that very
little research has been done to verify these assumptions (1, 2).
Shen et al. (1), setting out to test the second assumption,
recruited participants from different parts of the United States,
gave them different crime scenarios, and asked them to identify
which of the four mental states the protagonist of the scenario
was in. The research revealed that, although people were quite
good at distinguishing between intentional, negligent, and
blameless (no culpability) states, their ability to distinguish be-
tween a knowing and a reckless state was surprisingly poor, with
people confusing the two about 45% of the time. Nevertheless, in
a real court, to judge someone to have knowingly rather than
recklessly committed a criminal act can make an enormous differ-
ence in punishment. In fact, it can be, literally, a matter of life and
death: a defendant can be eligible for the death penalty if found to
have performed a lethal act knowing it would kill rather than merely
aware of a substantial risk that it would. With an individual’s free-
dom and potentially life hanging in the balance, it seems necessary
to find multiple and reliable ways to facilitate accurate sorting
between knowing and reckless mental states. To this end, scientific
evidence for (or against) biologically based and brain-based dis-
tinctions of knowing and reckless mental states, and the boundary
that may separate them, could help us either to refine or to reform
the ways criminal responsibility is assessed.
Currently, the most frequently used tool to study the neural
correlates of “mental states” is functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) (3). fMRI analysis has been recently used in the
context of the law, from trying to predict psychopathy (4) to
trying to understand what goes on in the brains of jurors when
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they are deciding whether to punish (5). However, no fMRI
studies of which we are aware have attempted to determine
whether and how the “culpable mental states,” as defined by the
MPC, map onto differential activations in the human brain.
Given that the main distinction between the knowing and
reckless mental states relies on the differential perception of
probabilities and uncertainty associated with an outcome (if
knowing you are “practically certain” of the outcome, i.e., P = 1,
whereas if reckless you are aware of a “substantial” risk but
uncertain, i.e., 0 < P < 1), potential brain areas differentially
associated with the knowing or reckless mental states could be
areas previously found in the neuroeconomics and decision-
making literature to be implicated in encoding probability or
uncertainty and risk (6–11). These areas include the posterior
parietal cortex (7, 12), the posterior cingulate cortex (12, 13), the
medial and lateral prefrontal cortex (6, 12), the thalamus (7, 8),
and the insula (9, 10). However, these studies almost always use
simple lotteries or gambling tasks (e.g., choice between two
decks of cards; guessing from which urn a ball came from) and
do not portray a legally relevant knowing vs. reckless situation.
Although typical fMRI analyses are descriptive in nature and
lack predictive power, new methods are emerging that try to find
multiregional brain activity patterns that collectively predict a
specific cognitive condition or individual characteristic (14–20).
This is a particularly challenging task, given that, with fMRI data,
the number of predicting variables is generally much higher than
the number of observations, and hence there is a risk of pro-
ducing either computationally intractable or strongly overfit
models (15, 21, 22). A new method has been suggested that tries
to tackle this problem by using elastic-net (EN) regression. EN
regression uses a mix of L1 and L2 regularization to prevent
overfitting, while at the same time ensuring that the final model
includes all of the relevant brain regions (14, 15, 21). This new
method could potentially be applied to predict the MPC’s “culpable”
mental states based on a person’s fMRI data.
In this study, we attempt to understand whether knowledge
and recklessness are actually associated with different brain
states, and which are the specific brain areas involved. Moreover,
we want to know whether it is possible to predict, based on brain-
imaging data alone (using EN regression), in which of those
mental states the person was in at the time the data were obtained.
We asked 40 participants to undergo fMRI while they decided
whether to carry a hypothetical suitcase, which could have con-
traband in it, through a checkpoint. We varied the probability that
the suitcase they carried had contraband, so that participants
could be in a knowing situation (they knew the suitcase they were
carrying had contraband) or a reckless situation (they were not
sure whether there was contraband in it, but were aware of a risk
of varying magnitude). We found that we were able to predict with
high accuracy whether a person was in a knowing or reckless state,
and this was associated with unique functional brain patterns.
Interestingly, this high predictive ability strongly depended on the
amount of information participants had available at the time the
information about the risks was presented.
Materials and Methods
Experimental Details.
Participants. Forty participants were recruited according to a protocol ap-
proved by the Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board. Written informed
consent was obtained from all participants. From these, one-half of the par-
ticipants (n = 20; 10 females) were placed in the Contraband-First condition
(see Experimental paradigm for details), whereas the other half (n = 20; 10
females) were placed in the Search-First condition. The mean age (± SD) for
each group was 26.9 ± 10.2 and 32.9 ± 11.9 y old, respectively.
Experimental paradigm. Participants were told a cover story about carrying
“valuable content” (such as documents, microchip processors, etc.), here
referred to as “contraband,” through a checkpoint (Fig. S1). Note that, al-
though the instructions did not use the term contraband so as not to dis-
courage participants that were averse to illegal behavior, we use the term
here for convenience. In each trial, they were shown between one and five
suitcases, only one of which actually contained contraband, and were asked
whether they were willing to carry a suitcase randomly chosen from the
group (Fig. S1A, Left). Hence, the number of suitcases shown represented
the risk of carrying the target suitcase with contraband (Contraband Risk): if
only one suitcase was presented, then the participants knew with certainty
that the suitcase had contraband in it (knowing situation, Pcontr = 1),
whereas if more than one suitcase was presented, they were not sure whether
the suitcase they were assigned contained contraband, but were aware of the
risk (reckless situation, with Pcontr = 0.5, 0.33, 0.25, or 0.2 of having contraband
in the suitcase). Participants also had different probabilities of being caught
(Search Risk), with the probability of being searched at the checkpoint ranging
from Psearch = 0 to 0.8 (symbolized by 10 tunnels, in which a proportion of
them could be occupied by a “guard”; Fig. S1A, Right). One-half of the par-
ticipants (n = 20) saw the probability of carrying a suitcase with contraband
after already being shown the search risk (Search-First group), whereas the
other half started by seeing the suitcases before being shown the search risk
(Contraband-First group). See Supporting Information for details.
Data Analysis. See Supporting Information for details on the behavioral and
fMRI data analyses. To perform the classification, we used an EN regression.
The goal of this analysis was to understand whether, given a particular brain
activation state, we could correctly predict which mental state the participant
was in at the time the brain data were collected. Namely, we wanted to know
whether we could disentangle whether the participant was in a knowing or a
reckless situation. To achieve that, we used as a classifier the EN regression (see
Fig. S2 and Supporting Information for step-by-step details). To assess the
“significance” of the results, correcting for finite sample sizes (23), we ran a
permutation test (Supporting Information).
Results
Behavioral Results. Behavioral data are presented in Fig. 1. Tests
of within-subject effects from a mixed-model ANOVA revealed
main effects for both Contraband Risk [F(4,152) = 20.7, P < 0.001]
and Search Risk [F(4,152) = 131.8, P < 0.001] on the decision to
carry the suitcase. Regardless of condition (Contraband-First or
Search-First), as the likelihood of a suitcase containing contraband
increased, decisions to carry the suitcase decreased. Similarly, re-
gardless of condition, as the likelihood of being searched increased,
decisions to carry the suitcase decreased. Furthermore, there was a
significant Search Risk vs. Contraband Risk interaction [F(16,608) =
10.2, P < 0.001]. A significant interaction was also observed be-
tween Search Risk and Condition [F(4,152) = 3.27, P = 0.013] but not
Contraband Risk and Condition [F(4,152) = 1.23, P = 0.302], and a
significant Contraband Risk by Search Risk by Condition interac-
tion was observed [F(16,608) = 3.39, P = 0.002]. Analysis revealed
that the magnitude of the main effect of Search Risk was contin-
gent on the order in which risk information was received. When
collapsing across Contraband Risk, data show that, for identical
degrees of Search Risk (00, 20, 40, 60, or 80%), seeing the search
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Fig. 1. Behavior summary. (A) Behavior for n = 20 participants seeing the
contraband risk first (Contraband-First condition). The percentage of times the
participant decided to carry the suitcase is on the y axis, whereas the Search Risk
(proportion of tunnels occupied by a guard) is on the x axis. Colors code the
Contraband Risk (number of suitcases presented, e.g., one suitcase: Pcontr = 1;
two suitcases: Pcontr = 0.5, etc.). (B) Behavior for n = 20 participants seeing the
search risk first (Search-First condition). Note the presence of a Search Risk by
Contraband Risk interaction in both conditions, but stronger in the Search-First
condition. Error bars represent SEM. See Table S1 for results of logistic regression.
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risk before contraband risk resulted in fewer decisions to carry
(mean ± SD = 99 ± 0.01%, 97 ± 0.02%, 76 ± 0.07%, 40 ± 0.23%,
and 29 ± 0.16%), compared with seeing the Search Risk after the
Contraband Risk (100 ± 0.00%, 99 ± 0.01%, 91 ± 0.04%, 59 ±
1.2%, and 24 ± 1.1%, respectively). This shows that, although the
content and the level of risk associated with a single decision was
identical, the order in which the information was received signifi-
cantly altered choice behavior. Specifically, seeing the search risk
before seeing the contraband suitcases typically decreased the
choice to carry contraband suitcases. Similar results were obtained
using a logistic regression (Supporting Information). As the order in
which information was presented significantly affected behavior,
these two groups/conditions will be analyzed separately. Finally,
note that fewer decisions to carry contraband are made when in-
dividuals are in knowing as opposed to increasingly reckless situa-
tions [observe one-suitcase [red] trials relative to two-, three-, four-,
and five-suitcase trials], indicating that the participant is indeed
aware that he/she is carrying contraband.
Classifier Performance. Using the brain-imaging data from the
participants in the Search-First condition (and only the trials in
which participants decided to carry the suitcase), we were able to
predict, with relatively high accuracy, whether the brain-imaging
data corresponded to a knowing (Contraband Risk: Pcontr = 1) or
a reckless (Pcontr = 0.2) situation (Fig. 2). The EN classifier had
an out-of-sample average area under the curve (AUC) value of
0.789 (AUC values close to 1 indicate “perfect” classification,
and close to 0.5 suggest random classification) and an average
correct classification rate (CCR) of 71% (Fig. 2A). These values
are significantly above chance, with P values obtained through a
permutation test equal to Pperm = 0.005 (i.e., only 1 in 200 models
run with shuffled labels had an AUC or CCR value as high or
higher than these; see Materials and Methods and Supporting In-
formation for details). This high accuracy was maintained even at
the single-subject level and when using a more stringent, double–
cross-validation procedure (see Supporting Information for details).
We find several areas in the brain predictive of being in a knowing
situation, namely dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and
medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), middle and anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), bilateral superior temporal gyrus/temporoparietal
junction (TPJ) and bilateral anterior insula (Fig. 2B and Table S2).
Areas more predictive of being in a reckless situation were mainly
in the occipital cortex (Fig. 2C). These brain areas were differen-
tially activated in a knowing and reckless situation, and, together,
the brain activity in them allowed predicting (significantly above
chance) in which situation the person was.
If we do the same analysis using brain imaging data from the
participants in the Contraband-First condition (i.e., at the time
the contraband risk was being shown they had not seen the
search risk yet), the results change. The accuracy of the EN
classifier in distinguishing between the knowing and reckless
condition drops to an out-of-sample average AUC value of 0.287
(Pperm = 1; Fig. 3A) and an average correct classification rate of
32.1% (Pperm = 1). For the knowing situation, the (right) TPJ also
appears, and for the reckless situation identical occipital areas
appear (Fig. 3B and Table S2). Note, however, that the coeffi-
cients associated with these voxels/areas have relatively small
survival rates, indicating that, for many of the model runs, none of
these voxels was very predictive of being in one state or another.
Although the visual information presented in both conditions is
identical, the lower predicting capability of the EN classifier in
these data compared with the Search-First condition indicates that
it is not the visual information in itself that drives the higher pre-
dictability of the model, and also that having or lacking complete
information about both the contraband risk and the probability of
getting caught (search risk) changes some of the brain patterns (or
at least the strength of the signal) associated with it.
The results obtained until now used Pcontr = 0.2 (five suitcases
presented) as the recklessness category. To analyze what hap-
pens to the EN model’s classification accuracy when different
contraband risks are used, we performed the same analysis but
comparing the knowing situation (Contraband Risk: Pcontr = 1)
with different forms of recklessness, varying with the Contraband
Risk (Pcontr = 0.5, 0.33, 0.25, or 0.2; Fig. 4). We find that, for the
Search-First condition, the EN classifier comparing the knowing
with most other recklessness states also allowed for a signifi-
cantly better than chance separation ability: for the EN classifier
distinguishing one vs. three suitcases (Pcontr = 1 vs. Pcontr = 0.33),
the average AUC was 0.924 and the CCR was 79.6% (Pperm = 0);
and for the EN separating one vs. four suitcases (Pcontr = 1 vs.
Pcontr = 0.25), the average AUC was 0.82 and the CCR was
75.7% (Pperm = 0). The performance of the EN classifier con-
trasting knowing with the recklessness state more near the
knowing situation (Pcontr = 1 vs. Pcontr = 0.5) was slightly worse,
with an average AUC value of 0.678 and a CCR of 55.3% (Pperm =
0.13 and Pperm = 0.11, respectively). On the other hand, for the
Contraband-First condition, the EN classifier does not perform
better than chance in distinguishing knowing from any of the
recklessness situations: for Pcontr = 0.5, the average AUC was
0.259 and the CCR was 32.2% (Pperm = 1 for both); for Pcontr =
0.33 (one vs. three suitcases), the average AUC was 0.38 and the
CCR was 35.3% (Pperm = 0.96 and Pperm = 0.85, respectively); and
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Fig. 2. The K/R distinction, for the Search-First condition. These results were
obtained based on the brain state at the time that the contraband risk is
revealed (suitcases shown), when the contraband risk is presented after the
search risk (Search-First condition, n = 20). (A, Top) Distribution of cross-
validated areas under the curve (AUCs). AUC values close to 1 indicate
“perfect” classification, whereas those close to 0.5 suggest random classifi-
cation. Forty iterations of a fivefold cross-validated EN regression were
performed, resulting in the 200 AUC calculations plotted in the histogram
(mean out-of-sample AUC = 0.79). (Bottom) Example of one receiver-oper-
ating characteristic (ROC) curve obtained, from which an AUC is drawn. The
dashed line represents a “curve” from a model that would perform at
chance level (hence the area under this “curve” is 50%, i.e., the AUC would
be 0.5). ROC curves consistently above this dashed line are associated with
AUC values higher than 0.5. (B) Areas predictive of being in a knowing sit-
uation (Pcontr = 1). Represented is the (signed) survival rate for the voxels.
The “signed survival rate” for a voxel is the proportion of times this voxel
was used in the EN classifier (i.e., got coefficient values different from zero),
multiplied by the sign of the average beta value for this voxel (see Sup-
porting Information for details). Hence, absolute survival rate values closer
to 1 mean that the voxel “survives” most of the cross-validated runs of the
EN algorithm, indicating that this voxel is relevant in distinguish a knowing
(Pcontr = 1) from a reckless (Pcontr = 0.2) situation. Voxels with a negative
signed survival rate are shown, indicating regions predictive of being in the
knowing situation (the base group in our model). (C) Areas predictive of
being in a reckless situation (Pcontr = 0.2; voxels with a positive survival rate).
Each voxel’s (signed) survival rate is overlaid on a sagittal (B, Top Left, x = 2;
C, Top, x = 14), coronal (B, Top Right, y = 20), or axial (B, Bottom, z = −2 Left,
z = 26 Right; C, z = 6) section of a 152-participant average T1 SPM brain
template (minimum survival rate for the cluster’s peak voxel of 0.5). The
xjView program was used to display all of the brain figures.
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for Pcontr = 0.25, the average AUC was 0.349 and the CCR was
34.2% (Pperm = 0.98 and Pperm = 0.92, respectively). The capability
of the EN model to distinguish between a knowing and a reckless
situation thus depended on both the degree of probability (Con-
traband Risk) and also the amount of information available to the
participant (in terms of Search Risk) at the time that the knowing
or reckless situation was being presented.
See Supporting Information for measures of single-subject
precision, double–cross-validation, and several control analyses
(Figs. S3–S7).
Discussion
In this paper, we set out to discover whether knowing and
reckless mental states, as defined by the MPC, correspond to de-
tectable different states in the human brain. Moreover, we wanted
to know whether we could predict which of those mental states the
person was in based only on the corresponding brain-imaging data.
Using EN regression on brain-imaging data of people exposed to
knowing or reckless scenarios, we found that knowing and reckless
are indeed associated with distinct brain states. Moreover, it was
possible to predict, with relatively high accuracy, which mental state
the person was in. This study is a first step in understanding how the
legally defined concepts of “knowledge” and “recklessness” map
onto different brain states and shows, as a proof of principle, that it
is possible to predict which legally defined mental state a person is
in based only on imaging data.
The fact that our EN model was able to distinguish between a
knowing or reckless state with higher than chance levels (although
far from perfect) indicates that, at least for some conditions, the
knowing and reckless states may indeed be correlated with, and so
possibly realized by distinct states of the human brain. This pre-
dictive ability was consistently found for various recklessness
states. However, for the recklessness state more near the knowing
condition (Pcontr = 0.5), the accuracy, even though relatively high,
was not significantly better than chance. This suggests that the
knowing/reckless (K/R) boundary may be more of a continuum,
and that when recklessness involves awareness of probability values
closer to those involved in the knowing situation, the K/R boundary
may be at least difficult to distinguish, and perhaps even blurred.
Also, the capacity of our model to distinguish the K/R states
strongly depended on participants already having information
about the risk of being searched. Together, these results are
consistent with the idea that the human brain has a K/R boundary,
but exactly how it is drawn may depend both on the distance be-
tween the knowing and reckless situations and on the amount of
information available to the person (in terms of search risk) at the
time the K/R situation is happening.
Observing the brain areas that were repeatedly used by the
model to predict which situation the participant was in sheds
light on what brain areas are differentially associated with a
knowing and a reckless “mental state.” One of the areas that
appeared more predictive of being in a knowing situation was the
anterior insula. This is in line with previous experiments impli-
cating the anterior insula in risk and uncertainty representation
(9, 10, 24). The insula was still differentially active even after
taking into account potential effects related with “risk” in terms
of uncertainty in reward, which is in accordance with studies
suggesting that it may have a general role in uncertainty that is
independent of the effects of reward (8, 10, 24). Another area
more involved in knowing than in reckless states was the dor-
somedial prefrontal cortex. The prefrontal cortex is generally
associated with executive decisions and making computations
(10, 25), including also the assessment of probabilities and un-
certainty (10, 12). Interestingly, in our experiment this area
seemed to be more engaged when the participants already had
seen the search risk associated with the trial. This suggests that
participants may be waiting to have all of the information
available to them to compute their decision. Finally, we also
obtained bilateral TPJ, which is known to be associated with
moral decisions (26). Areas specifically more predictive of being
in a reckless situation include the occipital cortex. Although this
may be related to simple visual effects specific to our task, as
more suitcases were presented on the screen in recklessness
scenarios, these areas have also been associated with higher
uncertainty in current information (likelihood), which is higher
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Fig. 3. The K/R distinction, for the Contraband-First condition. EN results
obtained in a similar way to what was presented in Fig. 2, but when the
contraband risk is presented before the search risk (Contraband-First con-
dition, n = 20). (A, Top) Distribution of cross-validated AUCs averaged over
200 values. Mean AUC is 0.29. (Bottom) Example of one ROC curve. (B) Re-
sults obtained with the EN model. Here, the survival rates are low. (Top)
Voxels more associated with a knowing situation are shown (negative surviv-
ing rate voxels). (Bottom) Voxels more associated with a reckless situation are
presented (positive surviving rate). Each voxel’s (signed) survival rate is overlaid
on an axial section (Top, z = 46; Bottom, z = 6) of a 152-participant average T1
SPM brain template (n = 20; minimum survival rate for the cluster’s peak voxel
of 0.2). Note that, here, we had to reduce the survival rate plotting threshold,
as no voxels appear with surviving rates higher than 0.5.
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Fig. 4. Changing the boundary: The effect of different degrees of reck-
lessness on the performance of the EN classifier. The out-of-sample perfor-
mance of the EN classifier is shown, when the knowing situation is contrasted
to different degrees of probability of carrying the target suitcase, that is,
different forms of recklessness. The performance measure used here is the
AUC. Represented are the mean AUC values ± SD (over the 200 runs) for each
fitted EN classifier. The results for both conditions are represented, namely, the
Search-First group (in blue) and the Contraband-First group (in red). The
dashed gray line signals the expected mean AUC for a model that would
perform at chance level (AUC = 0.5).
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in a reckless scenario (10). Future studies may tell if the areas we
found predictive of being in a knowing or reckless scenario gen-
eralize to other scenarios, for example, knowingly or recklessly
evading taxes.
Although the EN model was able to classify with high accuracy
a knowing or a reckless state in the Search-First condition, in the
Contraband-First condition the model did not perform better
than chance (even though the visual information was identical).
This effect of order of presentation of information was also seen
in behavior: seeing the search risk before contraband risk
resulted in fewer decisions to carry. It is well known that human
decision-making can be influenced by the manner in which options
are presented (27, 28). Our results suggest that this is true not only
for decisions involving multiple options but also for differing pre-
sentations of information related to a single decision. Alternatively,
it may be that participants are waiting to have all of the informa-
tion available to them to compute the associated contraband and
search risks.
The following question can then be raised: Do the brain areas
we are seeing correspond exclusively to knowing vs. reckless, or
are they just representing the search risk (or their interaction)?
In the inputs given to the model to distinguish K/R, search risk
had already been averaged out [modeled in different betas on
the same general linear model (GLM)]. Furthermore, if we an-
alyze only the trials in which no search risk was present the same
brain areas appear, indicating that they are differentially active
in knowing vs. reckless even when no search risk exists (Sup-
porting Information). Finally, extracting out the effects associated
with the probability of being caught (i.e., searched while carrying
contraband) still leads to the same results. Nevertheless, already
having the information about search risk or not affects both the
behavioral and the imaging results, hence search risk does matter
in some way. In the real world, the probability of getting caught
affects people’s decision to commit, or not, a crime. It is then
quite possible that the awareness of one’s risk of being caught
affects the manifestation of the culpable brain states themselves.
Future studies could aim at understanding more precisely the
effect of presentation of information and of search risk in the
knowing and reckless brain states.
A word of caution: even though increased activations in the
anterior insula, PFC, and TPJ were associated with a knowing
scenario, this does not mean that this particular brain pattern/
mental state could not appear in other situations, totally unrelated
to the K/R distinction. For example, it may well be that they appear
when assessing the probability of one event even if that event has no
legal relevance. What it does mean is that, if the subject was either
in a state of knowledge or reckless, then having this particular brain
state increased the chances that the participant was in a state of
knowledge (in contrast to recklessness).
To what extent is the difference between knowledge and
recklessness, as defined by the law, the same as the difference
between certainty and uncertainty? People are considered to act
knowingly, under the law, when they are certain that their con-
duct is accompanied by a specific circumstance (in our experi-
ment, that the suitcase contained contraband). In contrast, they
are considered to act recklessly if they are aware of a “substantial
and unjustifiable” risk that their conduct is accompanied by that
circumstance, but unsure of it. So, the distinction between knowl-
edge and recklessness is closely related to the ordinary distinction
between certainty and uncertainty.
However, knowledge and recklessness are both likely to have
more elements than certainty and uncertainty, respectively, have.
There will be cases of certainty that are not cases of knowledge in
the legal sense, and cases of uncertainty that are not cases of
recklessness. The knowing and reckless mental states generally
include an interpersonal relation, and they often include a moral
dimension. The brain areas we found support this notion. Specifi-
cally, although the anterior insula has traditionally been implicated
in uncertainty representation (among other things), albeit in non-
legally relevant settings (9, 10, 24), the TPJ has been more generally
associated with moral decisions (26, 29). Note also that these areas
appear even after abstracting out effects associated with Variance
in Reward. Future studies could deploy a similar experimental
setup and range of probabilities and choices but in a gambling
scenario, or a scenario involving taking a ball from two urns, to see
if similar areas are activated. Our prediction would be that, al-
though the uncertainty-specific areas might be maintained (insula),
others would not (e.g., TPJ).
The participants in this experiment, although more diverse
than typical college student subjects in such experiments (30),
are still not representative of the US population, let alone of the
general human population. Limitations on generalizing the re-
sults obtained by this classifier include the fact that we have a
small sample size (n = 40) and that the participant pool is re-
stricted to the Roanoke/Blacksburg (Virginia) area. Furthermore,
our experiment was done in a laboratory setting (with no real risk
of going to jail), and participants were given the exact probabilities
of events, whereas this may not be the case in “real life.” Never-
theless, these results show a proof of concept: the knowledge and
reckless mental states do seem to have distinct neural correlates,
at least for some people and in a situation like the one portrayed
in our experiment, and these neural correlates can be used to infer
which state the person was in. More studies, from different inde-
pendent laboratories, and with a broader participant pool are
needed to analyze the generalizability of these findings.
Future studies could also look at the other MPC mental states
not analyzed here, namely Purposeful and Negligent. Although
we have shown here that a recklessness mental state could be dis-
tinguished from a knowing mental state, to confirm that recklessness
is a mental state on its own future studies should see whether
recklessness can be distinguished from Negligence using brain
data alone. Similarly, future studies could look at the brain dis-
tinction between knowing and purposeful. The fact that typical
jurors seem to be able to make these distinction behaviorally
(1, 2) suggests this would be possible.
We conclude with some remarks about the potential legal
relevance of our findings, recognizing that under no circum-
stances should legal practice be altered in the face of any single
study, or even a small number of supporting studies. We want to
first emphasize the negative; there are various tempting con-
clusions to reach that should be resisted. In particular, it would
be absurd to suggest, in light of our results, that the task of
assessing the mental state of a defendant could or should, even in
principle, be reduced to the classification of brain data. For one
thing, our capacity to classify participants’ mental states depended
on the collection of brain data at the time of a potentially criminal
act. Obviously, in most cases, when someone is committing a crime
they are not doing so while inside a scanner. We do not know
whether it is possible, even in principle, to classify a person’s
mental state at a time that precedes the collection of brain data by
minutes, hours, days, or even years, as is necessary in criminal
trials. As it stands, our classifier represents a proof of concept, and
not yet a usable tool. Future studies might assess whether this
mental state can be recreated, for example by showing pictures of
the circumstances of the potential crime, and whether a recreation
of this kind would elicit particular brain states.
For another thing, our classifier’s ability to predict the mental-
state category of our participants was entirely dependent on our
ability to classify the mental states of the participants in the
“training” dataset without appeal to brain data. That is, our
ability to classify on the basis of brain data was parasitic on our
ability to conclude that, for instance, a participant who chose to
carry the suitcase when only one suitcase was offered to him
knew that he was carrying contraband. That conclusion was not
reached through a study of his brain activations but, instead,
through the commonsense interpretation of human behavior so
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familiar from everyday life. In addition, there are good reasons
to believe that the legitimacy of our verdicts in criminal cases
depends crucially on the fact, and the appearance, that the jury is
making an unmediated judgement about the culpability of the
defendant, rather than deferring to the results dictated by any
nonhuman tool. That would be lost were anyone but the jury
asked to assess the defendant’s mental state.
However, this is not to suggest that our results have no legal
significance. Legal scholars have argued about whether legally
relevant mental states, such as those defined in the MPC, are
arbitrary constructs or have some underlying resonance with
actual psychological states. If the mental state categories are
arbitrary constructs, then we should worry that differential
punishments driven by differential mental-state classifications
are equally arbitrary. Additionally, this is a source of potential
worry, for arbitrarily constructed categories are at risk for interfering
with the task of drawing merited distinctions; they sometimes, in-
stead, may reflect biases or can even be used to serve the ends of the
powerful. Our results suggest that the legally significant conceptions
of knowledge (certainty that a particular circumstance exists) and
recklessness (awareness of a possibility or probability that it exists)
are distinctly represented in the human brain, and generalize exist-
ing results from the decision-making and neuroeconomics literature
into the legal domain. These findings could therefore be the first
steps toward demonstrating that legally defined (and morally sig-
nificant) mental states may reflect actual, detectable, psychological
states grounded in particular neural activities. Whether a reckless
drug courier should be punished any less than a knowing one will of
course always remain a normative question. However, that question
may be informed by comfort that our legally relevant mental-state
categories have a psychological foundation.
Also, even if several future studies confirm what we have
observed here, that knowledge and recklessness are associated
with different brain states, if human jurors cannot distinguish
them behaviorally, then one may still ask whether they should be
considered relevant to assessments of criminal liability. Our re-
sults here do not settle this question. However, they are sug-
gestive. There could be no justice in punishing the knowing more
harshly than the reckless, if there is, in fact, no difference in the
minds of those whom we classify in one way and those we classify
in another. However, our results suggest that there is indeed such
a difference, and so it could be that we should work to help
jurors to see the distinction, and classify defendants accurately
under it, rather than abandoning it.
This work could also ultimately contribute to solving a more
practical, but just as daunting, problem: We know almost nothing
about the ways in which certain recognized mental disorders
might impact the processing of information and the occurrence
of the particular mental states that are inculpatory under the
MPC. Currently, the law in many jurisdictions handles this
problem by allowing defendants to introduce evidence of an al-
leged mental disorder (intoxication being the usual exception),
and then letting the judge or jury speculate about whether that
condition had any impact on the defendant’s mental functioning
at the time of the offense. So, for example, a defendant charged
with a knowing crime might introduce evidence that he has a
schizoaffective disorder and argue that that condition prevented
him from acting knowingly or recklessly, despite the fact that we
currently have little understanding about whether and under what
conditions people suffering from schizoaffective disorder are able
to process information about risks. Conversely, intoxication is
generally not a defense to “recklessness” crimes, but many states
allow evidence that a defendant was intoxicated at the time of an
offense to show that he or she did not have the “knowledge” re-
quired for a “knowing” crime. Understanding more about the way
our brains distinguish between legally relevant circumstances in the
world has the potential to improve what, up until now, has been the
law’s guesswork about the ways in which certain mental conditions
might impact criminal responsibility.
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